meltdown-exploit | Meltdown Exploit PoC
kandi X-RAY | meltdown-exploit Summary
kandi X-RAY | meltdown-exploit Summary
Speculative optimizations execute code in a non-secure manner leaving data traces in microarchitecture such as cache. Lipp et. al 2018 published their code 2018-01-09 at Look at their paper for details: Can only dump linux_proc_banner at the moment, since requires accessed memory to be in cache and linux_proc_banner is cached on every read from /proc/version. Might work with prefetch. Works with sched_yield. Build with make, run with ./run.sh. Can't defeat KASLR yet, so you may need to enter your password to find linux_proc_banner in the /proc/kallsyms (or do it manually). Flush+Reload and target array approach taken from spectre paper implemented following clues from Pandora's box is open. Take a look at the full exploit which works with IAIK's version on my machine.
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QUESTION
I read the article about the Meltdown/Spectre exploit that allow reading privileged data from the kernel using hardware bugs in the CPU. It says:
The trick is to line up instructions in a normal user process that cause the processor to speculatively fetch data from protected kernel memory before performing any security checks. The crucial Meltdown-exploiting x86-64 code can be as simple as...
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ANSWER
Answered 2018-Jan-05 at 10:46// Further down, there is pseudocode in C# that shows the complete process.
We have a kernel address rcx
which is the address of one byte (let's call the value of that byte "X") in kernel memory space that we want to leak. The currently running user process is not allowed to access this address. An exception will be thrown when doing so.
We have the probe array with the size 256 * 4096 bytes in user space which we can freely access. So, this is just some normal array which is exactly 256 pages long. The size of one page is 4096 bytes.
First, a flush operation is executed (First part of "Flush+Reload"). This tells the processor to completely clear the L1 cache. So, no memory page is cached in the L1 cache. (We don't see that in the code in the OP)
Then we execute the code mentioned in the OP.
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