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My knowledge comes from e.g. WG22 P0443R12 "A Unified Executors Proposal for C++".

Some differences up front: a work-guard

• does not alter the executor, instead just calling on_work_started() and on_work_finished() on it. [It is possible to have an executor on which both of these have no effect.]
• can be reset() independent of its lifetime, or that of any executor instance. Decoupled lifetime is a feature.

On the other hand, using prefer/require to apply outstanding_work sub-properties:

• modifies existing executors
• notably when copied, all copies will have the same properties. This could be dangerous for something as invasive as keeping an execution context/resources around.

However, not all properties are requirable in the first place. Doing some reconaissance using Ex defined as:

Ok, basically by reading the ssm session manager plugin source code I came up with the following simplified reimplementation that is capable of just grabbing the command output: (you need to pip install websocket-client construct)

Bitcoin and the coincurve library use canonical signatures while this is not true for the ecdsa library.

What does canonical signature mean?
In general, if (r,s) is a valid signature, then (r,s') := (r,-s mod n) is also a valid signature (n is the order of the base point).
A canonical signature uses the value s' = -s mod n = n - s instead of s, i.e. the signature (r, n-s), if s > n/2, s. e.g. here.

All signatures from the ecdsa library that were not been successfully validated by the coincurve library in your test program have an s > n/2 and thus are not canonical, whereas those that were successfully validated are canonical.

So the fix is simply to canonize the signature of the ecdsa library, e.g.:

Detecting the codec doesn't necessarily detect whether the system can support Dolby Atmos

Correct.

What reliable way is there to detect if your system will truly support Dolby Atmos whether its with a receiver or a Dolby Atmos compliant sound bar.

Unfortunately, this undetectable from the browser.

The browser itself and even the OS doesn't always know what is downstream. Sorry for the bad news!

CryptoJS only supports symmetric encryption and therefore not ECDSA. WebCrypto supports ECDSA, but not secp256k1.
WebCrypto has the advantage that it is supported by all major browsers. Since you can use other curves according to your comment, I will describe a solution with a curve supported by WebCrypto.
Otherwise, sjcl would also be an alternative, a pure JavaScript library that supports ECDSA and especially secp256k1, s.here.

WebCrypto is a low level API that provides the functionality you need like key generation, key export and signing. Regarding ECDSA WebCrypto supports the curves P-256 (aka secp256r1), P-384 (aka secp384r1) and p-521 (aka secp521r1). In the following I use P-256.

The following JavaScript code generates a key pair for P-256, exports the public key in X.509/SPKI format, DER encoded (so it can be sent to the Python site), and signs a message:

While switching to frame, the supported notations are:

• Switch to a frame using frame name:

The JWS x5c header parameter contains the entire certificate chain used to sign and validate the JWS. There is no need to fetch any other certificates or keys.

The RFC specifies that the certificate corresponding to the public key that was used to sign the JWS must be the first certificate.

You can extract the public key from this certificate and use it to verify the JWS signature. There is some guidance on this in this answer

One of the great improvements in StoreKit2 is that you are no longer required to use a server to validate in app purchase transactions securely.

Apple's WWDC 2021 session on StoreKit2 describes the content of the JWS and also shows how to validate on device that the JWS was actually generated for that device.

But, what if you do want to validate the transaction on a server? Since the x5c claim contains the certificate chain, an attacker could sign a forged JWS with their own certificate and include that certificate in the x5c claim.

The answer is that you have your app send the original transaction id to your server along with any other information you need, such as the user's account identifier. Your server can then request the corresponding JWS from Apple and validate the signature of the returned JWS.

As the JWS was fetched from Apple by your server code it can be sure that it is not a spoofed JWS.

If possible, include an appAccountToken in your purchase request and either determine the expected token value based on the user's authentication to your server or (less effective) have your app supply the token when it supplies the original transaction id. You can then verify the token value in the JWS matches the expected value. This makes it harder for an attacker to replay some other purchase event.

The Element you are trying to find profile_page_insights_hubble is in an Iframe.

Need to switch to iframe to access the Element.

Try like below and confirm:

This utility should be able to figure out what's wrong with your setup. Can you give it a try?