Ether | A Command-Line Interface for the Swift Package Manager | Command Line Interface library

After seeing whole log line entry

I fixed it by myself. The management interface itself was missing a route to the VLAN2 net. Works now :)

If you want an iteration of the ContinueWith approach (using the more modern await), something like this should work:

SLS 8.1.3 Pattern Binders states

A pattern p implies a type T if the pattern matches only values of the type T.

The pattern Earthy(i) in

Your (browser-facing) app can communicate with the MetaMask browser extension using the Ethereum Provider API.

Speficically the eth_sendTransaction method passing it the data field (specifying which function in your contract you want to execute, as well as the passed argument values), along with other params such as the sender address.

If you're new to MetaMask, just a quick note: To get the user's list of addresses, you need to call the eth_requestAccounts method.

You've got a redundant default gateway on victim and attacker called _gateway. You should delete it and leave only the one going to the router via eth1 interface.

I could not test it well but you can try the following:

Add:

the second argument u passed is type 'float' instead of the required 'int'.

For security, the driver refuses to send these types of packets by default.

Of course, since you have the source code to the driver, you are free to modify this restriction however you like — it's your driver. You can add a line to specifically allow the 0x88A4 EtherType, or delete the entire if-statement to allow all EtherTypes. You can require the usermode process to be running as Administrator if it wants to send "suspicious" network frames.

A bit more detail on the security angle. If you allow untrusted users/programs to place arbitrary data onto the network, that may compromise or weaken network security. This is why the sample driver (and Windows in general) does not allow arbitrary programs to put arbitrary data on the network.

For example, a malicious program that has unrestricted access to the Ethernet layer can advertise a malicious DHCP server that points clients to a malicious DNS server, conduct ARP poisoning attacks on your switch, DoS a switch (with, for example, 802.3x PAUSE frames, or with LLDPDUs that undermine the QoS policy), or circumvent any firewall policies you might have.

These potential attacks aren't necessarily a deal-breaker: consider that this is roughly the equivalent of allowing someone to plug an arbitrary unmanaged device into an Ethernet jack on your network. If your network already has measures in place to defend against hostile Ethernet endpoints, then removing restrictions from the sample driver not making things much worse. Alternatively, if you have some level of trust for all the users & code on the PCs that will run your driver, then modifying the driver won't matter. Or if your threat model already assumes the network is hostile and unreliable, then removing these restrictions will only help fulfill your threat model's expectations. ;)