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Look at the modifier's table

https://bulma.io/documentation/helpers/typography-helpers/

It doesn't look consistent to me for example

has-text-left-mobile applies to mobile size only.
has-text-left-tablet applies to tablet and all larger sizes.

So you cannot assume that has-text-centered will apply to the remaining sizes, you should specify both mobile and tablet size.

On your second code

A density curve always represents data between 0 and 1, whereas a count data are multiples of 1. So it does mostly not make sense to plot those data to the same y-axis.

The left plot shows density line and histogram for data similar to the ones from you - I just added some. The height of the bar shows the percentage of counts for the corresponding x-value. The y-scale is smaller than 1.

The right plot shows the same as the left, but another histogram is added which shows the count. The y-scales goes up and the 2 density plots shrink.

If you want to scale both to the same scale, you could to this by calculating a scaling factor. I have used this scaling factor to add a secondary y-axis to the third plot and saling the sec y-axis accordingly.

In order to make clear what belongs to what scale I have colored 2nd y-axis and the data belonging to it red.

how attackers would practically modify the client-side code. I´m fairly inexperienced when it comes to modifying client-side JavaScript code, so I would really appreciate to understand the process and learn to what degree I have to secure my application.

A debugger checkpoint and modifying variables from the browser Developer Tools debugger or console is one obvious way, for someone who knows their way around the normal tools that ship with all major browsers.

If you don't, the most straightforward way to modify client-side JS is to download the JS file or HTML-with-JS document, make whatever changes you want, then serve up your replacement with an extension like Resource Override and go through the flow again.

On the opposite end of practicality, the client could be a custom browser executable written from scratch in whatever language, with its own or a modified JavaScript interpreter. Or simply an open source browser like Firefox or Chromium, modified and then compiled.

Essentially the client has the potential to send and receive and execute whatever commands it (and hence, an attacker) wants. It's completely non-secure, and your server must validate everything you want validated. Not some things, every thing.

So, always assume the client _could_ be a 100% malicious actor, and trust absolutely nothing just because it supposedly came from "your own" client-side code.

I had the exact same problem earlier this week. I fixed it by disabling UPX entirely. You could go through adding more and more of the QT DLLs to the UPX exclude list to figure out which ones specifically it's corrupting if you still want to compress some of them, but for now I'm ok with just having it disabled entirely.

I tried many things - different versions of PyQT5, different versions of other libraries, none of that had any effect.

If you have a .spec file for folder based build, be sure to disable UPX in both the exe and coll sections.

You could do

That's some pretty strange code, but there is one case where the default parameter could be used - if undefined is explicitly passed as the first parameter:

you probably can try to use patchwork package

https://patchwork.data-imaginist.com instead of grid.arrange

Then you need to just use

I'm not used to use jest.spy on my test but I think you could try something like:

It even depends on the SPI (JCE) implementation, indeed you don't need any password to list a JKS store.

Certificates aren't confidential, but you wouldn't want anyone to tamper with the list of certificates the system should trust (e.g. providing a rogue/false root CA).

There should be a way to enforce trust of the truststore (the password should be validated). If you provide a wrong password, will it fail?

Yes it will fail, and if you don't provide a password you can't update the truststore

indeed, that's expected behavior. For JKS keystores you may list entries and certificates without any password, but unable to verify the integrity. Anyway you should provide a password with your application to make sure nobody sc..wd with your truststore.