nvd | Downloads NVD Feeds and does some simplistic parsing

For our code, we do:

Since your XML is fairly flat, consider the recently added IO module, pandas.read_xml introduced in v1.3. Given XML uses a default namespace, to reference elements in xpath use namespaces argument:

I was misunderstanding how those temporary "tables" work. You still need to select from them as you would a normal table. I also rolled the three named subqueries from the 'findings' insert into anonymous subqueries inside the values, much cleaner.

Add the following to your gradle.build file:

We can use

1. Create Parent Component with logic to get data from URL and pagination onCLick handler.

2. Parent Component should render VendorsDetail component and Pagination component.

3. Pass data to be displayed to VendorsDetails component and getSubsequentData handler to Pagination component.

4. If user click on specific page number, call getSubsequentData handler with specific argument, that updates the state of the parent component, which will updates VendorsDetail component.

   const ParentComponent = () => {

Probably not.

The only packages that would a priori be affected would be those that depend — directly or indirectly — on Java components, since the log4j vulnerability itself only affects Java code using the log4j Java pacakge.

Bob Rudis scanned for potential vulnerabilities in packages hosted on CRAN and posted the results on the R-pkg-devel mailing list:

I've scanned all of CRAN with — https://github.com/mergebase/log4j-detector — (and looked for the log4j v2 jar directly) and it's all good […]

The odds of any R environment being impacted by this vulnerability were super slim (to almost none) to begin with and — if the tool is accurate — it's 0.

You need to JSON.parse(data) before being able to access the properties.

In order for a vulnerability to be a risk to you, several things need to come together:

1. the corresponding library exists in your environment
2. the corresponding library calls do happen in your environment at runtime
3. 3rd party users figure a way to get their (unchecked) input to that library call

Nobody here can tell you whether "2." and ".3" are applicable in your environment.

But: when you eliminate 1., you know that "2." and "3." are no longer possible. Or the other way round, as long as you 100% convinced that there is no path how a user can enter data into your system that makes it to the corresponding API, then you should be fine even with leaving the library sitting in your environment. But as said, having the library is the mandatory first element of the chain. So while that is present, it is possible that somebody writes code tomorrow that gets you to "2" and "3"!

Thus, keep in mind the perspective of higher management: most likely, the business decision might be: reduce the risk to 0, so make sure you don't even have the corresponding JAR sitting on your machines.

_{In my bigcorp environment, orders were pretty simple: don't waste any time analysing whether your code uses the corresponding interfaces. When your projects contain the vulnerable JAR, upgrade it immediately. Period.}